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HOSANNA-TABOR AND SUPREME COURT
PRECEDENT: AN ANALYSIS OF THE
MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION IN THE CONTEXT
OF THE SUPREME COURT‘S HANDS-OFF
APPROACH TO RELIGIOUS DOCTRINE
Samuel J. Levine*
INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court‘s review of the decision of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in the case of HosannaTabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC1 could lead to a
major development in the Court‘s Religion Clause jurisprudence.2 On one
level, Hosanna-Tabor presents important questions regarding the
interrelationship between employment discrimination laws and the
constitutional rights of religious organizations. The narrow issue at the
center of the case is the ―ministerial exception,‖ a doctrine that precludes
courts from adjudicating discrimination claims arising out of disputes
between religious institutions and their ministerial employees.3 This Essay
suggests, however, that the real significance of Hosanna-Tabor goes
beyond the Court‘s application of the ministerial exception to the particular
facts of the case. This Essay looks at the ministerial exception through the
broader prism of the Supreme Court‘s ―hands-off‖ approach to religious

*
Professor of Law & Director, Jewish Law Institute, Touro Law Center. This Essay is based on my
remarks presented as part of a panel on Hosanna-Tabor at the Second Annual Law and Religion
Roundtable hosted by Andy Koppelman at Northwestern University School of Law on June 23 and 24,
2011. I thank Andy and the conference organizers, Rick Garnett, Paul Horwitz, and Nelson Tebbe, for
inviting me to participate on the panel and the participants at the Roundtable for helpful conversations. I
thank Paul and the editors of the Northwestern University Law Review for publishing the Colloquy
essays in connection with the panel, and I thank the editors of the Law Review for helpful comments on
an earlier draft. Finally, I thank Kent Greenawalt for thoughtful discussions of these issues and for
continued support and guidance.
1
131 S. Ct. 1783 (2011) (granting petition for writ of certiorari for the Sixth Circuit‘s decision in
EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch., 597 F.3d 769 (6th Cir. 2010) (link))
(link).
2
See U.S. CONST. amend. I (―Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .‖) (link).
3
See, e.g., Combs v. Cent. Tex. Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church, 173 F.3d 343,
345–47 (5th Cir. 1999) (link); EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 460–63 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(link).
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doctrine, which prohibits judicial inquiry into a wide range of questions
relating to religious practice and belief. 4
Although a number of courts have adopted and applied the ministerial
exception, both the constitutional basis for this principle and its scope are
less than clear.5 Through a close reading of the opinion of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, this Essay suggests that the outcome
in Hosanna-Tabor turns on an analysis of the ministerial exception within
the broader context of a hands-off approach to religion.6 Indeed, in an
opinion written by Judge Richard Posner, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit drew an explicit connection between the
two doctrines, referring to ―[t]he ministerial exception, and the hands-off
approach more generally . . . .‖7 Likewise, in looking at Hosanna-Tabor,
this Essay aims to explore and relate the constitutional concerns underlying
both the ministerial exception and the Supreme Court‘s hands-off approach.
Specifically, this Essay argues that the Sixth Circuit opinion is inconsistent
with Supreme Court precedent, running afoul of the Court‘s hands-off
approach by relying on analysis of either the Free Exercise Clause, the
Establishment Clause, or both, that requires judicial interpretation of
religious doctrine.
Therefore, the Essay concludes that the Supreme Court will have a
number of options available for deciding Hosanna-Tabor. Most narrowly,
the Court may limit its response to a review of the reasoning and ruling set
forth in the Sixth Circuit opinion, deciding that because the Sixth Circuit‘s
analysis contradicts Supreme Court precedent, the Sixth Circuit‘s holding
should be reversed. Alternatively, widening the scope of review, the
Supreme Court may use Hosanna-Tabor to address, for the first time, the
broader issue of the ministerial exception, providing guidance and direction
for deciding future employment disputes involving religious organizations.
Yet, this Essay encourages the Court to take a more ambitious and
more dramatic step, viewing Hosanna-Tabor as an opportunity to rethink
the hands-off approach to questions of religious practice and belief. In the
past, scholars and courts have encountered difficulty in attempting to

4
See Nat‘l Spiritual Assembly of Baha‘is of U.S. Under Hereditary Guardianship, Inc. v. Nat‘l
Spiritual Assembly of Baha‘is of U.S., Inc., 628 F.3d 837, 846 n.2 (7th Cir. 2010) (link); Samuel J.
Levine, The Supreme Court’s Hands-Off Approach to Religious Doctrine: An Introduction, 84 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 793, 795 (2009) (link).
5
See, e.g., Richard W. Garnett, Religion and Group Rights: Are Churches (Just) like the Boy
Scouts?, 22 ST. JOHN‘S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 515, 526–27 (2007); Richard W. Garnett, A Hands-Off
Approach to Religious Doctrine: What Are We Talking About?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 837, 855–56
(2009) (link).
6
See Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036, 1039 (7th Cir. 2006) (referring to ―[t]he
ministerial exception, and the hands-off approach more generally‖) (link).
7
Id.
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understand and apply elements of the Court‘s hands-off doctrine.8 The
Sixth Circuit‘s lack of clarity and consistency in Hosanna-Tabor may stand
as illustration of some of these difficulties. Thus, Hosanna-Tabor may
provide a particularly valuable opportunity for the Supreme Court to return
to—and possibly rethink, reconsider, and reformulate—the current handsoff approach to religious doctrine.
I.

A BRIEF SUMMARY OF HOSANNA-TABOR

A. Background
Although the Sixth Circuit opinion provides considerable background
details, some of which appear to be in contention among the parties, a brief
summary of the facts may be helpful. In 1999, Hosanna-Tabor Church, an
ecclesiastical corporation affiliated with the Lutheran Church-Missouri
Synod (LCMS), hired Cheryl Perich to teach at a school it operates in
Redford, Michigan.9 Perich taught at the school for several years under the
title of ―commissioned minister‖ of the LCMS.10 When Perich became ill in
2004, she agreed to the recommendation of Hosanna-Tabor‘s administrators
that she take disability leave for the following school year.11 For over two
months, beginning on December 16, 2004, Perich and the school engaged in
a variety of disputes regarding her medical condition and the status of her
future employment at the school.12 Perich reported for work on February
22, 2005 after receiving clearance from her doctor. However, the school
informed Perich that her employment would likely be terminated. Perich
threatened to file a disability discrimination suit in response.13 On March
19, 2005, Hosanna-Tabor informed Perich that its Board of Directors would
consider rescinding her call to teach due to insubordination and disruptive
behavior and stated that she had damaged her relationship with HosannaTabor ―beyond repair‖ by ―threatening to take legal action.‖14
Two days later, Perich‘s lawyer formally informed Hosanna-Tabor‘s
lawyer of the possibility that Perich would file a discrimination charge. 15
On April 11, 2005, Hosanna-Tabor terminated Perich pursuant to a vote of
the congregation.16 Perich responded by filing a charge of discrimination
and retaliation with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
8
See Kent Greenawalt, Hands Off! Civil Court Involvement in Conflicts over Religious Property,
98 COLUM. L. REV. 1843, 1846 (1998); Samuel J. Levine, Rethinking the Supreme Court’s Hands-Off
Approach to Questions of Religious Practice and Belief, 25 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 85, 86 (1997).
9
EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch., 597 F.3d 769, 772 (6th Cir. 2010).
10
See id.
11
Id. at 773.
12
See id. at 773–74.
13
Id. at 774.
14
Id.
15
Id. at 775.
16
Id.
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(EEOC), and the EEOC subsequently filed a complaint against HosannaTabor for retaliation in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990 (ADA).17 When the case came before the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Michigan, the court granted Hosanna-Tabor‘s
motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the ministerial exception
to the ADA barred the court from inquiring into Perich‘s retaliation claim.18
Perich and the EEOC then appealed to the Sixth Circuit.
Hosanna-Tabor argued that in submitting her claim outside an internal
church forum, Perich violated church doctrine, demonstrating that she was
not qualified to continue to function as a minister within the church and
resulting in her dismissal.19 Perich countered that neither the school‘s
employment manuals nor the correspondence between her and HosannaTabor referenced church doctrine or the procedure for internal dispute
resolution.20 Therefore, in Perich‘s view, Hosanna-Tabor‘s actions were not
taken pursuant to religious doctrine.21
The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court‘s decision, primarily on the
grounds that ―the district court erred in its legal conclusion classifying
Perich as a ministerial employee.‖22 The Sixth Circuit found that ―Perich‘s
primary function was teaching secular subjects, not ‗spreading the
faith . . .‘‖23 and her ―extra religious training . . . did not affect the duties she
performed in the classroom on a daily basis.‖24 Therefore, the court held,
Perich did not qualify as a ministerial employee for the purposes of
applying the ministerial exception to her dispute with Hosanna-Tabor.
B. The Sixth Circuit Opinion
The Sixth Circuit‘s decision, reversing the district court, turns entirely
on the court‘s interpretation of the contours of the ministerial exception and
its application to the facts of the case. Yet, the Sixth Circuit‘s discussion of
the constitutional basis for the ministerial exception relies on seemingly
imprecise and unspecific constitutional analysis, raising questions about the
strength of the court‘s assessment. The Sixth Circuit‘s analysis opened
with the broad and arguably vague assertion that ―[t]he ministerial
exception is rooted in the First Amendment‘s guarantees of religious
freedom.‖25 The court then divided this section of the opinion into two
17

42 U.S.C. §§ 12117(a), 12203(a) (2006) (link).
EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch., 582 F. Supp. 2d 881, 892 (E.D.
Mich. 2008), rev’d, 597 F.3d 769 (6th Cir. 2010) (link).
19
See Hosanna-Tabor, 597 F.3d at 774, 781.
20
See id. at 782.
21
See id.
22
Id. at 780.
23
Id. (quoting Hollins v. Methodist Healthcare, Inc., 474 F.3d 223, 226 (6th Cir. 2007) (link)).
24
Id.
25
Id. at 777.
18
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subsections, each offering a theory to explain the rationale behind the rule
that courts are precluded from adjudicating claims between churches and
their ministerial employees.
In the first subsection, entitled ―Interference in Church Governance,‖
the court stated that the ministerial exception ―precludes subject matter
jurisdiction over claims involving the employment relationship between a
religious institution and its ministerial employees, based on the institution‘s
constitutional right to be free from judicial interference in the selection of
those employees.‖26 The court identified neither a constitutional provision
nor a Supreme Court case that articulates such a ―constitutional right‖ of
religious institutions. Instead, in apparent support for this asserted right, the
court merely appended a reference to a Supreme Court case, Serbian
Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich.27 The reference to Milivojevich,
which follows the similarly vague signal, ―[s]ee generally,‖28 includes
neither a pin cite nor a parenthetical, and is offered without any further
context or comment. Although Milivojevich may very well have some
bearing on the issue of judicial interference in church governance, the
opinion leaves it to the reader to determine the relationship, if any, between
Milivojevich and the ministerial exception. Indeed, the Supreme Court has
not yet recognized the ministerial exception in Milovejevich or any other
case.
The second subsection in this section of the Sixth Circuit opinion
begins with the heading, ―Interpretation of Church Doctrine.‖29 Here again,
the court‘s constitutional analysis remains vague, offering the declaration
that ―the ministerial exception is also motivated by the concern ‗that secular
authorities would be involved in evaluating or interpreting religious
doctrine.‘‖30
The lack of specificity in both of the court‘s theories is telling. The
court does not identify a textual basis for the ministerial exception in either
the Free Exercise Clause or the Establishment Clause. Instead, the court
alludes to a ―constitutional right‖ for a religious institution to be free from
judicial interference and to a ―concern‖ over courts‘ interpretations of
religious doctrine.31 The Sixth Circuit‘s failure to support these assertions
with a direct citation to Supreme Court precedent raises further questions
about the soundness of the ministerial exception‘s doctrinal basis.

26
27
28
29
30
31

Id. (quoting Hollins, 474 F.3d at 225).
426 U.S. 696 (1976) (link).
Hosanna-Tabor, 597 F.3d at 777.
Id. at 781.
Id. (quoting Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036, 1039 (7th Cir. 2006)).
Id. at 777, 781.
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II. THE MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION, THE RELIGION CLAUSES, AND
SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT: OPEN QUESTIONS ABOUT HOSANNA-TABOR
A careful consideration of the Sixth Circuit opinion in Hosanna-Tabor
requires a more precise analysis of the constitutional basis for the
ministerial exception. However, to the extent that the Sixth Circuit
implicitly intended to rely on the Supreme Court‘s interpretation of either
the Free Exercise Clause or the Establishment Clause, the court‘s reasoning
in Hosanna-Tabor appears to contradict Supreme Court jurisprudence in
both of these areas. Specifically, in relying on judicial interpretation of
religious doctrine, the Sixth Circuit opinion is inconsistent with Supreme
Court‘s hands-off approach to questions of religious practice and belief.
A. The Free Exercise Clause
Although the Sixth Circuit opinion did not include an express citation
to the Free Exercise Clause, the court may have been alluding to free
exercise protections through its reference to a religious institution‘s
―constitutional right to be free from judicial interference in the selection of
[ministerial] employees.‖32 If so, however, the court‘s application of free
exercise rights in Hosanna-Tabor seems inconsistent with basic elements of
the Supreme Court‘s free exercise jurisprudence.
As a threshold matter, current free exercise doctrine may exclude
application of the ministerial exception to employment discrimination
claims. In the landmark 1990 case Employment Division v. Smith, the
Supreme Court held that a law that is facially neutral and generally
applicable does not run afoul of free exercise protections, even if the law
places a burden on a religious practice.33 In Hosanna-Tabor, Perich
claimed that the school violated her employment rights pursuant to the
ADA, a facially neutral and generally applicable law.34 Therefore, under
Smith, even if enforcement of the ADA would interfere with the school‘s
ability to select its ministerial employees, arguably burdening its religious
exercise, the school would not have a free exercise claim in the context of
the requirements of the ADA. The contours of the ministerial exception
would simply not extend to provide a defense against a violation of a
generally applicable law.35
Alternatively, some courts have held that the ministerial exception
survived the Smith decision,36 and therefore, the school may have a free
exercise claim against the application of the ADA to disputes regarding its
32

Id. at 777 (quoting Hollins v. Methodist Healthcare, Inc., 474 F.3d 223, 225 (6th Cir. 2007)).
494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (link).
34
See Hosanna-Tabor, 597 F.3d at 776–77.
35
See, e.g., Black v. Snyder, 471 N.W.2d 715, 719 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (link).
36
See, e.g., Combs v. Cent. Tex. Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church, 173 F.3d 343,
348–49 (5th Cir. 1999); EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 461–63 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
33
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ministerial employees. Nevertheless, putting aside possible concerns over
Smith, the Sixth Circuit‘s analysis in Hosanna-Tabor appears to conflict
with other aspects of Supreme Court precedent. Specifically—and
somewhat ironically—in an ostensible effort to apply a hands-off approach
to judicial interference in religious practice, the Sixth Circuit‘s analysis
instead contradicts other elements of the Supreme Court‘s hands-off
approach to interpreting religious doctrine in free exercise cases.
In the 1981 case, Thomas v. Review Board, the Supreme Court
considered the free exercise claim of a Jehovah‘s Witness, Eddie Thomas,
who quit his job on the ground that his religion prohibited him from
working on the production of armaments.37 Thomas argued that the state‘s
subsequent denial of his unemployment benefits violated his constitutional
right to the free exercise of religion.38 The Indiana Supreme Court rejected
his claim, in part because it found that his decision to quit was based on his
―personal philosophical choice‖ rather than religious belief.39
The Supreme Court reversed, rejecting the methodology the Indiana
court used in its determination that Thomas‘s objection to working on
armaments did not qualify as free exercise of religion.40 The Court
observed that ―[t]he Indiana court . . . appears to have given significant
weight to the fact that another Jehovah‘s Witness had no scruples about
working on tank turrets; for that other Witness, at least, such work was
‗scripturally‘ acceptable.‖41 In contrast, the Supreme Court emphasized the
need for judges to maintain a hands-off approach in addressing matters of
internal religious dispute.42
With respect to the dispute between Thomas and another Jehovah‘s
Witness, the Court noted that ―[i]ntrafaith differences of that kind are not
uncommon among followers of a particular creed . . . .‖43 In these
scenarios, the Court insisted, ―the judicial process is singularly ill equipped
to resolve such differences in relation to the Religion Clauses.‖44 Declaring
that ―the guarantee of free exercise is not limited to beliefs which are shared
by all of the members of a religious sect,‖ the Court concluded that
―[p]articularly in this sensitive area, it is not within the judicial function and
judicial competence to inquire whether the petitioner or his fellow worker
more correctly perceived the commands of their common faith. Courts are
not arbiters of scriptural interpretation.‖45

37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45

Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Emp‘t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 709 (1981) (link).
See id. at 711–12.
Id. at 712–13.
See id. at 716.
Id. at 715.
See id. at 716.
Id. at 715.
Id.
Id. at 715–16.
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As in Thomas, the outcome in Hosanna-Tabor may turn, in part, on the
appropriate judicial response to an intrafaith dispute central to the religious
claim in the case. One of the key points of contention between the parties
in Hosanna-Tabor is whether Perich‘s primary duties as a teacher at the
school were religious or secular in nature.46 As a matter of interpreting its
own religious doctrine, the school characterized Perich‘s duties as spiritual
in nature while Perich advocated a different view of her position, pointing
to what she saw as the largely secular nature of her duties.47 According to
the Sixth Circuit, the resolution of this crucial question would determine
whether Perich‘s employment status qualified for the ministerial
exception.48
Nevertheless, rather than resolving the argument between HosannaTabor and Perich regarding the nature of her employment, the district court
applied a hands-off approach to the intrafaith dispute.49 As it explained at
length:
The separation of church and state in the United States
has made federal courts inept when it comes to religious
issues; the inquiry into the value of an employee in
furthering a religious institution‘s sectarian mission is no
different. The lack of clarity in federal court cases
regarding elementary school teachers should not hinder
churches from valuing teachers as important spiritual
leaders and deciding who will fill those positions as
ministerial employees, subject, of course, to inappropriate
uses of the title ―minister‖ as subterfuge. For these reasons,
it seems prudent in this case to trust Hosanna-Tabor‘s
characterization of its own employee in the months and
years preceding the events that led to litigation. Because
Hosanna-Tabor considered Perich a ―commissioned
minister‖ and the facts surrounding Perich‘s employment in
a religious school with a sectarian mission support this
characterization, the Court concludes that Perich was a
ministerial employee. If, on these circumstances, the Court
were to conclude otherwise, it would risk ―infring[ing]
upon [Hosanna-Tabor‘s] right to choose its spiritual
leaders.‖

46

See EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch., 597 F.3d 769, 778 (6th Cir.

2010).
47

See id. at 780–81.
See id. at 778.
49
See EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch., 582 F. Supp. 2d 881 (E.D.
Mich. 2008), rev’d, 597 F.3d 769 (6th Cir. 2010).
48
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Because Perich was a ministerial employee of
Hosanna-Tabor, this Court can inquire no further into her
claims of retaliation. Under the circumstances, ―the free
exercise clause of the First Amendment protects the act of a
decision rather than a motivation behind it. In these
sensitive areas, the state may no more require a minimum
basis in doctrinal reasoning than it may supervise doctrinal
content.‖50
Although the district court did not cite Thomas, its reasoning followed
a similar approach to intrafaith disputes over religious doctrine. Because
the district court understood the ministerial exception to be grounded in the
free exercise rights of a religious institution, the court declined to conduct
an ―inquiry into the value of an employee in furthering a religious
institution‘s sectarian mission . . . .‖51 Rather, as in Thomas, the court took
a hands-off approach to the question of religious doctrine, accepting the
religious adherent‘s assertion that the conduct at issue constituted an
element of the free exercise of religion. Accordingly, the court found it
―prudent in this case to trust Hosanna-Tabor‘s characterization of its own
employee . . . .‖52 In fact, without a direct citation, the district court‘s
conclusion echoes the Court‘s language in Thomas, referring to ―these
sensitive areas‖ of doctrinal determination that remain outside judicial
competence.53
In contrast, the Sixth Circuit‘s analysis in Hosanna-Tabor seems to
conflict with the hands-off approach prescribed by the Supreme Court in
Thomas. Engaging in the kind of inquiry that the district court in HosannaTabor—and the Supreme Court in Thomas—considered improper, the Sixth
Circuit rejected the school‘s characterization of Perich‘s role. Instead, the
court reached its own conclusion that Perich‘s duties were not sufficiently
spiritual in nature to qualify her position for the ministerial exception.54
To justify its reversal of the district court‘s findings, the Sixth Circuit
asserted that ―the district court relied largely on the fact that Hosanna-Tabor
gave Perich the title of commissioned minister and held her out to the world
as a minister by bestowing this title upon her.‖55 As the appellate court
noted, according to some courts, the mere title of minister is insufficient to
demonstrate that an employee‘s position is, in fact, spiritual in nature and

50

Id. at 891–92 (citations omitted).
Id. at 891.
52
Id. at 892.
53
Id.
54
See EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch., 597 F.3d 769, 780–81 (6th
Cir. 2010).
55
Id. at 780.
51
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therefore subject to the ministerial exception.56 However, the Sixth Circuit
failed to acknowledge that the district court expressly rejected
―inappropriate uses of the title ‗minister‘ as subterfuge‖ for the purpose of
improperly applying the ministerial exception to a non-ministerial
employee.57 Contrary to the Sixth Circuit‘s assertion—and consistent with
Supreme Court precedent in Thomas—the district court relied not on the
title granted by the school, but on Hosanna-Tabor‘s doctrinal understanding
of Perich‘s role as a teacher.58
Indeed, as the Sixth Circuit acknowledged, Hosanna-Tabor
―characterizes its staff members as ‗fine Christian role models,‘‖ serving, in
the school‘s view, an important religious function.59 Moreover, in a
footnote, the court quotes Hosanna-Tabor‘s citation to Perich‘s own
statement that ―the educational ministry is special because the teacher can
bring God into every subject.‖60 Yet, rather than accepting HosannaTabor‘s characterization—or Perich‘s characterization, for that matter—of
the spiritual value of the classroom teacher, the Sixth Circuit imposed its
own formalistic standard, finding that ―only twice did Perich bring religion
into otherwise secular subjects.‖61 The opinion failed to recognize,
however, the variety of ways in which, from its own perspective, a religious
institution may look to teachers of all subjects to bring God into the
classroom.62 In short, contrary to the Supreme Court‘s hands-off approach
in Thomas, the Sixth Circuit seemed willing to substitute its own
understanding of religious doctrine for that of the religious adherent whose
free exercise rights it is adjudicating.63
Notably, near the close of the subsection of the opinion concerned with
judicial interference in church governance, the Sixth Circuit emphasized
that the ―intent of the ministerial exception is to allow religious
organizations to prefer members of their own religion and adhere to their
56

Id. at 780–81 (citing EEOC v. Sw. Baptist Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d 277, 285 (5th Cir.
1981) (link)).
57
Hosanna-Tabor, 582 F. Supp. 2d at 891–92.
58
See id.
59
Hosanna-Tabor, 597 F.3d at 780.
60
Id. at 780 n.8 (quotation marks omitted).
61
Id.
62
See Christopher C. Lund, In Defense of the Ministerial Exception, 90 N.C. L. REV. (forthcoming
2011) (manuscript at 59–60), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1883657 (describing various ways in
which teachers in religious schools may be expected to integrate religion into every subject) (link).
The Sixth Circuit‘s failure to appreciate the perspective of the religious school in this case mirrors
some of the Supreme Court‘s failures to understand the perspectives of religious minorities. See Samuel
J. Levine, Toward a Religious Minority Voice: A Look at Free Exercise Law Through a Religious
Minority Perspective, 5 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 153 (1996).
63
See Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass‘n, 485 U.S. 439, 457–58 (1988) (―[T]he
dissent‘s approach would require us to rule that some religious adherents misunderstand their own
religious beliefs. We think such an approach cannot be squared with the Constitution or with our
precedents, and that it would cast the Judiciary in a role that we were never intended to play.‖).
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own religious interpretations.‖64 Ironically, in rejecting Hosanna-Tabor‘s
characterization of the spiritual value and religious significance of Perich‘s
position, the Sixth Circuit refused to allow a religious organization to
adhere to its own religious interpretations.
Of course, in deciding Hosanna-Tabor, the Supreme Court has the
option to reconsider and revise the hands-off approach to permit the kind of
judicial interpretation of religious doctrine that served as the basis for the
Sixth Circuit holding. In fact, courts and scholars have encountered some
difficulty understanding and applying the Court‘s hands-off approach,65
suggesting the need for the Court to clarify its rulings in this area.
Nevertheless, the Sixth Circuit‘s analysis contradicts the current state of the
hands-off approach. Therefore, absent a substantial overruling by the
Supreme Court of its own precedent, the Sixth Circuit opinion should likely
be reversed.
B. The Establishment Clause/Church Property Cases
As an alternative—or perhaps as a complement—to a free exercise
analysis, other parts of Sixth Circuit opinion suggest that its allusion to ―the
First Amendment‘s guarantees of religious freedom‖ that lie at the ―root[]‖
of the ministerial exception66 may refer to religious freedoms protected by
the Establishment Clause. Again, however, the Sixth Circuit‘s analysis
requires judicial interpretation of religious doctrine, contradicting the
Supreme Court‘s hands-off approach in Establishment Clause cases as well.
Following the subsection in the Hosanna-Tabor opinion that focuses
on governmental interference in church governance, a less extensive
subsection refers to an ―addition[al] . . . concern ‗that secular authorities
would be involved in evaluating or interpreting religious doctrine.‘‖67
Although, as Thomas illustrates, concerns over judicial interpretation of
religious doctrine apply to free exercise cases as well, though these
concerns are more commonly associated with the Establishment Clause.
Therefore, in raising this issue in the context of Hosanna-Tabor, the Sixth
Circuit quite possibly locates the ministerial exception within the
protections of the Establishment Clause. Nevertheless, given the absence of
an express reference to the Establishment Clause in Hosanna-Tabor, it may
be necessary to examine the court‘s opinion more carefully in an effort to
identify the precise constitutional basis and nature of the constitutional
―concern‖ over judicial evaluation of religious doctrine.
In articulating this concern, the court relies on and quotes from the
opinions of two other circuit courts that have applied the ministerial

64
65
66
67

Hosanna-Tabor, 597 F.3d at 781.
See Greenawalt, supra note 8; Levine, supra note 8.
Hosanna-Tabor, 597 F.3d at 777.
Id. at 781.
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exception, the Seventh Circuit and the Fifth Circuit.68 Accordingly, it may
be helpful to look at the reasoning underlying each of these cases to better
understand the constitutional basis for the court‘s analysis of the ministerial
exception in Hosanna-Tabor.
In the first case cited, Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, Judge
Richard Posner, writing for the Seventh Circuit, identified two ―First
Amendment concerns with assuming jurisdiction in ecclesiastical cases.‖69
Both of these concerns seemingly parallel the concerns the Sixth Circuit
raised in Hosanna-Tabor:
The first concern is that secular authorities would be
involved in evaluating or interpreting religious doctrine.
The second quite independent concern is that in
investigating employment discrimination claims by
ministers against their church, secular authorities would
necessarily intrude into church governance . . . even if the
alleged discrimination were purely nondoctrinal. This
second aspect of the internal-affairs doctrine is called the
―ministerial exception‖ to the exercise of federal
jurisdiction.70
Upon close examination, however, Judge Posner‘s analysis may not
serve to clarify the Sixth Circuit‘s reasoning in Hosanna-Tabor. First,
unlike the Sixth Circuit, Judge Posner tied the ministerial exception
specifically to the concern over judicial intrusion into church governance,
which he expressly distinguished as ―independent‖ from the proposition
that courts should not interpret religious doctrine.71 Thus, as a basic matter,
Judge Posner‘s conception of the ministerial exception appears to differ
from that of the Sixth Circuit, which identifies opposition to judicial
determination of church doctrine as a motivating factor for the ministerial
exception.72
Second, like the Sixth Circuit, Judge Posner referred to vague ―First
Amendment concerns‖ and only briefly cited Supreme Court precedent in
support of a prohibition on judicial interpretation of religious doctrine.73
Ultimately, notwithstanding a somewhat more extensive discussion and
more citations to Supreme Court cases, the Seventh Circuit likewise did not
delineate the constitutional grounds for the ministerial exception in a
68
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manner that would provide insight into the Sixth Circuit‘s constitutional
analysis in Hosanna-Tabor.
A more helpful analysis may be found in the other case cited in
Hosanna-Tabor. In Combs v. Central Texas Annual Conference of United
Methodist Church, following an extensive free exercise discussion, the Fifth
Circuit added: ―Having a civil court determine the merits of canon law
scholarship would be in violent opposition to the constitutional principle of
the separation of church and state.‖74 Although the court did not cite the
Establishment Clause, the reliance on the separation of church and state
suggests that this concern is grounded in the Establishment Clause.
Moreover, the court in Combs cited Presbyterian Church v. Mary
Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church,75 a case involving a
church property dispute, for the proposition that ―civil courts are not
permitted to determine ecclesiastical questions.‖76 The reliance on
Presbyterian Church is significant, as the Fifth Circuit‘s analysis thereby
drew a parallel between the ministerial exception and church property
cases. While Hosanna-Tabor will provide the first opportunity for the
Supreme Court to consider the ministerial exception, church property cases
have formed the building blocks of the Court‘s hands-off approach to
religious doctrine.77 Therefore, to the extent that church property cases play
a significant role underlying both circuit court approaches to the ministerial
exception and the Supreme Court‘s hands-off approach, perhaps the Sixth
Circuit‘s analysis of the ministerial exception in Hosanna-Tabor is best
evaluated through a closer look at the Supreme Court‘s hands-off approach
in church property cases.
Presbyterian Church, the case cited in the Fifth Circuit‘s analysis of
the ministerial exception, involved yet another intrafaith dispute: two local
churches withdrew from a national church contending that the national
church violated the organization‘s constitution and departed from church
doctrine.78 The Georgia state courts held that the national church‘s control
over the property depended on its adherence to doctrine as it existed at the
time of the local church‘s affiliation.79 Here too, the Supreme Court
forcefully rejected an approach that required courts to interpret and apply
religious doctrine:
First Amendment values are plainly jeopardized when
church property litigation is made to turn on the resolution
by civil courts of controversies over religious doctrine and
74
75
76
77
78
79

Combs, 173 F.3d at 350.
393 U.S. 440 (1969) (link).
Combs, 173 F.3d at 350.
See Greenawalt, supra note 8, at 1856; Levine, supra note 8, at 88–90.
See Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. at 442.
See id. at 443–44.

132

106: 120 (2011)

Hosanna-Tabor and Supreme Court Precedent

practice.
If civil courts undertake to resolve such
controversies in order to adjudicate the property dispute,
the hazards are ever present of inhibiting the free
development of religious doctrine and of implicating
secular interests in matters of purely ecclesiastical
concern . . . . [T]he Amendment therefore commands civil
courts to decide church property disputes without resolving
underlying controversies over religious doctrine. . . . The
Georgia courts have violated the command of the First
Amendment . . . .
[T]he
departure-from-doctrine
element . . . requires the civil court to determine matters at
the very core of a religion—the interpretation of particular
church doctrines and the importance of those doctrines to
the religion. Plainly, the First Amendment forbids civil
courts from playing such a role . . . . To reach those
questions would require the civil courts to engage in the
forbidden process of interpreting and weighing church
doctrine.80
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court‘s unequivocal declarations in
Presbyterian Church and other church property cases that the First
Amendment prohibits courts from interpreting and determining religious
doctrine, the Court‘s opinions are less committal regarding the precise
textual or doctrinal grounds for this constitutional principle. As Kent
Greenawalt observed in commenting on Presbyterian Church: ―Without
distinguishing the effect of the two religion clauses, the Court considered
their joint operation to preclude states from using a departure-from-doctrine
standard.‖81 However, as Greenawalt and others have further noted, a
meaningful analysis and application of the Court‘s church property cases
requires a determination of the precise constitutional basis for the Court‘s
holdings.82 After all, although the Court does not distinguish between the
two Religion Clauses in these cases, as a doctrinal and conceptual matter, a
Free Exercise Clause analysis of church property disputes differs
substantially from an Establishment Clause analysis.
For his part, Greenawalt has analyzed the Supreme Court‘s hands-off
approach in church property cases primarily under the Lemon test for the
Establishment Clause.83 In particular, Greenawalt has suggested that the
―entanglement worry‖ of the Lemon test ―fits very well with a strong
‗hands-off approach;‘ courts should not become adjudicators of religious
80
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matters.‖84 Under this interpretation of the Establishment Clause, courts are
prohibited from deciding cases that would entangle them in matters of
church doctrine and governance. Accordingly, just as the Supreme Court
has taken a hands-off approach to disputes over the ownership of church
property, the Sixth Circuit applied the ministerial exception in HosannaTabor to maintain a hands-off approach to a dispute over the appointment
and dismissal of ministers.
Still, viewing the ministerial exception within the broader context of a
general prohibition on judicial entanglement in religious matters would
raise questions about the Sixth Circuit‘s analysis in Hosanna-Tabor. Under
the Supreme Court‘s hands-off approach, judges may not engage in an
inquiry that would require investigation, interpretation, and determination
of church doctrine. The church property cases are one illustration of the
Court‘s attempts to place limitations on the judiciary‘s role in litigation that
arises out of intrafaith disputes over matters of religion. Similarly, the
hands-off approach would seem to preclude judicial involvement in
intrachurch disputes over the employment of ministers, including doctrinal
disputes between a religious employer and a ministerial employee.
However, in Hosanna-Tabor the Sixth Circuit did, in fact, engage in
the kind of religious interpretation prohibited under the hands-off approach.
According to Hosanna-Tabor, Perich violated church doctrine that required
her to submit her claim to an internal church forum for dispute resolution.85
Hosanna-Tabor further contended that Perich‘s failure to follow church
doctrine demonstrated that she was not qualified to continue to function as a
minister within the church, resulting in her dismissal.86 Perich countered
that the LCMS personnel manual and the Governing Manual for Lutheran
Schools ―clearly contemplate that teachers are protected by employment
discrimination and contract laws.‖87 Moreover, Perich noted that the
correspondence between her and Hosanna-Tabor did not reference church
doctrine or the procedure for internal dispute resolution.88 Therefore, in
Perich‘s view, Hosanna-Tabor‘s actions were not taken pursuant to
religious doctrine.89
The conflicting arguments between Hosanna-Tabor and Perich
revolved squarely around the parties‘ conflicting interpretations of Lutheran
church doctrine. Therefore, judicial resolution of these arguments would
require a determination of the correct interpretation of church doctrine.
However, pursuant to Supreme Court precedent in cases of intrafaith church
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properly disputes, a court would be precluded from adjudicating these
questions in favor of either interpretation. Applying the Supreme Court‘s
hands-off approach to the dispute in Hosanna-Tabor, a court would have no
authority to reject Hosanna-Tabor‘s interpretation of its own religious
doctrine, and therefore, no grounds for ruling in favor of Perich‘s
discrimination claim. Nevertheless, the Sixth Circuit endorsed Perich‘s
interpretation, faulting Hosanna-Tabor for ―attempt[ing] to reframe the
underlying dispute . . . to the question of whether Perich violated church
doctrine by not engaging in internal dispute resolution.‖90 By its very
nature, the court‘s characterization and repudiation of Hosanna-Tabor‘s
argument is premised on the court‘s determination that Perich, and not
Hosanna-Tabor, has correctly interpreted church doctrine.
The Sixth Circuit offered no explanation as to why its approach would
not violate Supreme Court precedent, or why its analysis would not
contradict the Sixth Circuit‘s own articulation of one of the concerns
underlying the ministerial exception: ―that secular authorities would be
involved in evaluating or interpreting religious doctrine.‖91 Ultimately, in
rejecting the applicability of the ministerial exception and the hands-off
approach to the dispute between Hosanna-Tabor and Perich, the Sixth
Circuit appears to have rejected the underlying basis for both the ministerial
exception and the broader hands-off approach to matters of religious
doctrine.
CONCLUSION
The pending Supreme Court consideration of Hosanna-Tabor has
brought about much anticipation among scholars, practitioners, and
religious organizations. The case has engendered both scholarship and
amicus briefs addressing and advocating both sides of the dispute. In Rick
Garnett‘s opinion, Hosanna-Tabor will be ―among the most important
religious-freedom decisions of the last 30 years.‖92
The Supreme Court will have a number of options available when it
selects a methodology for deciding Hosanna-Tabor. On one level, the
Court may choose to take a narrow view of the case, limiting its review to
the analysis and ruling set forth in the Sixth Circuit opinion. Under this
option, the Court may conclude that the Sixth Circuit‘s analysis
contradicted basic elements of the Supreme Court‘s hands-off approach to
religious doctrine, and therefore, the Sixth Circuit‘s holding should be
reversed. As detailed at length in this Essay, whether the Sixth Circuit was
relying on Free Exercise or Establishment Clause principles, its application
90
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of the ministerial exception to the dispute between Hosanna-Tabor and
Perich included modes of inquiry that are inconsistent with the Supreme
Court‘s hands-off approach.
Alternatively, for the first time, the Supreme Court may address the
broader issue of the ministerial exception. As a judicially created doctrine
with constitutional implications, the ministerial exception has been the
source of substantial controversy and confusion among courts and scholars
alike. Accordingly, the ministerial exception would seem to be a
particularly suitable doctrine for the Supreme Court to take on directly. A
Supreme Court decision confronting complex issues revolving around the
basis, scope, and contours of the ministerial exception would provide courts
across the country with sorely needed guidance and direction.
Finally, and most ambitiously, perhaps the Supreme Court will see
Hosanna-Tabor as an opportunity to rethink the hands-off approach to
questions of religious practice and belief. Both scholars and courts have
encountered difficulty attempting to understand and apply elements of the
Court‘s hands-off doctrine.93 The Sixth Circuit‘s lack of clarity and
consistency in Hosanna-Tabor may stand as an example of some of the
substantive drawbacks to the Supreme Court‘s current approach.
Policy concerns over the Court‘s hands-off approach may be even
more significant. There are certainly strong reasons underlying the general
principle that courts should be reluctant to engage in the interpretation and
determination of religious questions. However, the Supreme Court‘s broad
articulation and application of this principle preclude courts from
adjudicating a wide range of disputes, at times impeding the effective
administration of justice.94
This concern may manifest itself in Free Exercise challenges, in which
a court‘s unwillingness to carefully analyze religious questions may result
in decisions that are too deferential to the religious adherent or—more
likely—the government.95 Likewise, in some Establishment Clause cases, a
court‘s failure to examine the religious character of a practice or symbol
may prevent an appropriate and careful balancing of the interests of
nonestablishment with those of acceptable accommodation, resulting in
improper governmental endorsement of religion or inadequate acceptance
of appropriate forms of public expression.96
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Finally, in cases of intrafaith disputes, such as church property cases
and Hosanna-Tabor, a court‘s refusal to look into the asserted religious
grounds for a religious organization‘s decisions may grant too much
deference to powerful institutions. In these cases, less powerful groups and
individuals may find themselves bereft of legal recourse for otherwise
meritorious legal claims. Thus, Hosanna-Tabor may provide a particularly
valuable opportunity for the Supreme Court to return to—and possibly
rethink, reconsider, and reformulate—its hands-off approach to religious
doctrine.
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